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NUCLEAR POWER IN FRANCE 
Melissa McA/oose 
Introduction 
For the past twenty years, France has been 
leading the world in the production of nuclear 
energy for electricity generation. Following an 
intense program of nuclear power plant con-
struction throughout the country, the French 
now rely on nuclear power for 80 percent of 
their total electricity production. The state-
owned Electricite de France (EdF) is the cor-
poration in charge of the program, which has 
given France almost complete energy indepen-
dence. Although the French have benefited 
tremendously from this nuclear system by gain-
ing energy independence and enjoying elec-
tricity at rather cheap rates, there have also 
been drawbacks to this system- in particular, 
the debt that EdF has accumulated. 
Two important issues facing the French 
electricity industry concern EdF's monopoly 
rights, which will be affected by European inte-
gration, and diversification of power generation. 
(lEA, p. 200) It will be difficult for France, a 
country that has tried for many years to be ener-
gy independent, to now become part of a union 
that will force interdependence by allowing for-
eign electric utilities to sell their electricity with-
33 
in French borders. Also, because of their heavy 
dependence on nuclear power, the French must 
look for alternatives to diversify the fuel mix of 
their new generating capacity. In doing so, the 
French government is looking to increase the 
role of independent producers. Some say that 
this could mean an end to the nuclear power 
program, arguing that nuclear energy is not as 
efficient or competitive as natural gas energy. 
However, through joint ventures and foreign 
investments, EdF is working to ensure the 
longevity of nuclear power. Whether or not 
they'll succeed is anybody's guess. 
In this paper, I assess the future viability 
of nuclear power in France. I first discuss the 
history of the French nuclear power industry, 
as well as the advantages and disadvantages of 
the program. I then discuss the movement 
toward electricity liberalization in the European 
Union. I conclude by describing France's efforts 
to sustain the use of nuclear power through for-
eign joint ventures and government subsidies. 
History 
In 197 4, following the first oil embargo, 
France began an intensive program to build 
nuclear power plants in order to limit its depen-
dence on imported oil. Responsibility for the 
program was given to Electricite de France, the 
state electricity utility based in Paris. There are 
now 57 reactors in service in France. EdF owns 
and operates 55 of them, and the other two are 
experimental fast-breeder reactors, neither of 
which is in operation because of technical prob-
lems. (lEA, p. 202) Upon taking over this 
responsibility, EdF has gained a near monopoly 
on the generation and distribution of electric-
ity in France. The following table illustrates 
the breakdown of energy generation in France: 
Table 1 
Energy Production in France 
EdF 
Local public corporations (regies) 
Independent hydro producers 
Charbonnages de France ( CdF) 
Industrial autoproducers 
93.8% 
0.4% 
0.8% 
2.3% 
2.7% 
Source: International Energy Agency, p. 203. 
It is notable that CdF is also a government orga-
nization. Independent power producers (IPPs) 
generally have no right of access to the EdF 
transmission and distribution grid. The only 
exception is autoproducers, companies that 
produce electricity for their own use, who have 
the right to supply three other sites owned by 
the same company. Legislation also requires 
all other smaller electricity producers to sell all 
of their energy to EdF at the minimal going rate 
(20 centimes per Kwh in 1993), and allows EdF 
to resell the electricity to customers within its 
power grid. For example, Societe Hydroelec-
trique de Grangevielle, a small private compa-
ny located in the French Alps almost within the 
Italian border, under current regulations must 
use EdF as a middleman although the local 
Italian distributor is only two kilometers away. 
As a result, Societe Hydroelectrique must 
accept a price per unit which is just half of what 
the Italians are willing to pay. (Wilsher, p. 24) 
EdF has long believed that nuclear power 
is the cheapest form of electricity generation. 
A major part of the success of the nuclear pro-
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gram has been France's use of one standardized 
plant design and technology, the Westinghouse 
pressurized water reactor (PWR). The basic 
design of the PWR has not changed over the 
years. 1\vo manufacturers were chosen to build 
the French PWR technology: Framatome S.A. 
designs and supplies the steam supply systems, 
and GEC Alsthom makes the high-power tur-
bogenerators for the plants. The Commissariat 
a l'Energie Atomique (CEA) is the government 
agency responsible for research, developing 
nuclear prototypes and assisting government 
in the field of safety. Standardizing the reac-
tors has not prevented EdF from being innov-
ative in its reactor design. It has continually 
integrated advances in design in order to 
improve the performance of the reactors since 
the program began in 1974. (Valenti, p. 36) 
The first generation of PWRs built in 
France had the capacity of 900 megawatts. The 
EdF has been constantly upgrading the older 
units to make them technically identical to the 
newer models. There are 18 of these reactor 
pairs scattered throughout the country, and they 
are all still in operation. In 1976 planning and 
construction had already begun on the next gen-
eration of reactors, the 1300-megawatt series. 
These PWRs differ from the 900-megawatt series 
because they have single-unit design instead of 
paired-unit design. This total unit autonomy 
allows for easier operation and maintenance. 
The 1300-megawatt series also has improved 
automatic instrumentation and control systems. 
All 20 of these units are currently in operation. 
Construction of the newest generation of PWRs, 
six 1400-megawatt units, began in 1984. The 
major improvement in the 1400-megawatt 
series is the single flow of steam as compared to 
the older model's double flow. This change 
allows for more megawatts to be produced for 
the same energy input. In addition, the CEA has 
improved the fuel cycle and PWR technology 
that all French nuclear power plants use. 
(Valenti, p. 37) All of these nuclear power plants 
will be in operation until2010 when construc-
tion of the next generation will start. 
Another major contributor to the success 
of the French nuclear power industry has been 
the approach to maintenance. The French 
believe that maintenance is equally as impor-
tant as plant operation. In fact, 60 percent of 
the remaining budget, after capital and fuel-
related costs, is devoted to maintenance, where-
as only 40 percent is devoted to operations. In 
most other countries, this is not the case. EdF's 
maintenance engineers must all have experi-
ence working in a plant, as well as organiza-
tional and communications training. A large 
part of the training of these engineers is pro-
vided by Cetic, EdF's Maintenance Preparation 
and Qualification Center for PWR systems, 
located at Chalon-sur-Saone. ("France's EdF: A 
World Leader. .. ," p. 47) 
Advantages of Nuclear Power 
The French have reaped the benefits of 
nuclear power since the beginning of their pro-
gram more than twenty years ago. The first 
advantage, and the main reason for the switch 
to nuclear energy, is the energy independence 
that it has given the French. In fact, France's 
dependence on imported oil at the time of the 
1973 oil crisis was about 75 percent. (NEA, 
p. 29) Having very little of their own fossil fuel, 
nuclear energy has given them independence 
from imported oil and coal. EdF also maintains 
that nuclear power is, and always has been, the 
cheapest method of generating electricity, 
which is true when initial investment is not 
included as a part of generation cost. 
Since nuclear power is rather inexpensive 
compared to other methods of electricity pro-
duction and is also subsidized by the French 
government, industrial users in France have the 
advantage of paying less for their electricity 
than all other EC countries except Denmark. 
(Cooke, p. 40) EdF likes to keep these indus-
trial prices low because it believes that it 
encourages foreign investment in France. This 
has been true for such companies as Exxon 
Chemical, Eka Nobel (the Swedish chemical 
company), and Allied Signal (the U.S. engi-
neering and motor components group). 
(Cooke, p. 40) About 40 percent of the total 
electricity use in France is by industrial users 
with the residential and commercial sector 
accounting for the remainder. (lEA, p. 202) The 
cost to residential households is relatively cheap 
as well, ranking near the European average. 
EdF's electricity prices are set according 
to published tariffs for customers who consume 
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up to 40MW per year, which is applicable in 
France as well as in its departments and terri-
tories overseas. Individual contract terms are 
negotiated for larger customers on a "suppos-
edly" non-discriminatory basis. (lEA, p. 200) 
EdF has several different tariff levels for differ-
ent customer categories which are based on 
consumption. According to the Economist, "A 
complex set of cross-subsidies ensures that con-
sumers of each category pay identical electric-
ity tariffs, even if they live in remote rural 
areas." ("How the French Get Power," p. 62) 
The guidelines that EdF has followed to secure 
the support of the people has made its nuclear 
power program a symbol of national unity. 
The absence of competition has allowed 
EdF to focus on environmental cleanliness, 
whereas in a competitive market the focus is on 
profits. It is notable that the French program 
has never had a serious mishap since its begin-
nings. With its superb safety record, the people 
are not as concerned with the safety of these 
plants as in other countries, so public support 
for EdF remains strong. Priding itself on safe-
ty and cleanliness, EdF reaffirms that nuclear 
power plants are cleaner than coal-burning facil-
ities. It has been able to dramatically reduce the 
amount of sulfur dioxide emitted into the envi-
ronment from 1 million tons in 1980 to 85,000 
tons in 1987. (Valenti, p. 39) France's C02 emis-
sions have fallen by 1/3 since 1980.1t attributes 
2/3 of this reduction to nuclear energy and 1/3 
to energy conservation policy. (lEA, p. 204) 
The absence of competition also has 
meant job security for the employees of the 
nuclear program. Guaranteed a job for life, EdF 
employees and their families are very much 
opposed to any sort of deregulation. In fact, the 
unions protest strongly any time the issue is 
brought up. There are close to 1, 700 workers 
at each site, half of whom are local labor. The 
half of the work force that is not drawn from 
the local population can cause a population 
increase of up to 2,500 people in any locality 
where a nuclear site is constructed. (Valenti, 
p. 38) This creates a lot of local business for 
regions with a nuclear plant nearby, and once 
again the EdF is able to gain public support. 
The intensity of the nuclear program's 
development has allowed EdF to become the 
world's second largest electricity producer. The 
fact that EdF operates in a non-competitive 
market has been beneficial to the French by giv-
ing them energy security. With approximately 
55 nuclear power plants operating throughout 
the country, the French do not fear shortages 
of electricity. EdF is also the leading exporter of 
electricity in Europe. With excess capacity, it is 
able to export 13 percent of its total production 
to Britain, Switzerland, Italy, and Germany. 
(lEA, p. 202) In fact, France supplies 5 percent 
of Britain's electricity through the Channell ink. 
In addition to its exports, EdF has been able to 
tap into other international markets by becom-
ing a leader in safety. It now helps countries in 
Asia, South America, and Eastern Europe to 
operate their plants safely and efficiently. 
Disadvantages of Nuclear Power 
Unfortunately for the French, there are 
also many disadvantages to relying on nuclear 
power for 80 percent of their electricity gener-
ation and for allowing EdF to operate in a 
monopolistic environment. Although the 
French have long argued that nuclear power is 
the cheapest form of electricity generation, 
many other argue that it is expensive and 
unpopular. There are many sunk costs that go 
into building a nuclear site. Although EdF has 
drastically lowered these costs in comparison to 
other countries through the use of a standard-
ized design, it has still devoted a lot of capital to 
building its nuclear program. In fact, EdF has 
accumulated a debt of Ffr 230 billion to the 
French government in a Ffr 800 billion indus-
try. Without price increases, EdF will never be 
able to start repaying this debt. To make mat-
ters even more difficult, the French government 
has regulations that require EdF to keep its 
electricity price increases to 1.5 percent below 
the national inflation rate. EdF already has 
"meager" profits compared to many privatized 
electricity firms. This may not be surprising 
considering some of EdF's practices, such as 
selling exported electricity for 22.4 centimes per 
Kwh in the UK when it costs 22.5 centimes per 
Kwh to produce. (Cooke, p. 41) In 1995, EdF 
had a net income, including debt service, of 
Ffr 2.7 billion ($541 million). This income rep-
resents only 2 percent of its turnover of 
Ffr 188.6 billion. This compares unfavorably 
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with Britain, whose companies' profits have 
been equal to about 10 percent of their turnover. 
Another problem plaguing EdF is the 
burning question of how to decommission the 
current operating reactors when their time 
comes. If its financial status remains the way 
it is now, EdF will not have nearly enough 
money to carry out decommissioning without 
going even further into debt. The French gov-
ernment wants EdF to set up a separate fund 
for the sole purpose of decommissioning reac-
tors. Although EdF had previously set aside 
·funds for this purpose, these funds have been 
depleted by the need for new investments or 
debt repayment. If the French had originally 
included the cost of decommissioning reactors 
in setting prices, their electricity would be more 
expensive than it is now. However, more expen-
sive electricity would be highly unpopular with 
the citizens of France. EdF's managing direc-
tor, Jean Bergougnoux, had pledged to cut its 
debt by a third before 2005. This is unlikely to 
happen, however, because of the higher costs 
for safety, decommissioning, and waste dispos-
al. ("Chained to Reactors," 1991, p. 60) 
Another major problem that has not yet 
affected EdF, but that will ultimately have a 
drastic effect on their relationship with the pub-
lic, is the storage of radioactive waste. 
Currently EdF stores low-activity waste on the 
surface in the Manche region. High-activity 
wastes and alpha-radiation waste that result 
from decommissioning will be stored in some 
form of storage supervised by the Agence 
Nationale pour la Gestion des Dechets 
Radioactifs. This issue has been a major con-
cern for the French public. The government 
will pick underground sites, and then EdF will 
begin safety tests on those sites. Already, they 
have received public protests at some of the 
sites being tested. The government has given 
EdF until the year 2006 to finish investigating 
the waste-disposal problem. 
Rumors that natural gas may soon be 
replacing more of the nuclear capacity have 
caused troubles for EdF. In 1990, EdF 
announced that it would convert one of its old-
est nuclear stations to run on natural gas. 
Many people in France are beginning to believe 
that gas may very well be cheaper for electrici-
ty generation than nuclear energy. However, 
because France does rely so heavily on nuclear 
energy, it is very vulnerable to the shutdown of 
any reactors. ("Chained to Reactors," p. 60) 
Losing the generation from one reactor could 
cause a major loss of energy production, and 
possibly loss of exports as well as income from 
those exports. 
The Movement toward Deregulation 
Perhaps the biggest problem plaguing EdF 
in the last few years has been the movement of 
the European Union toward electricity liberal-
ization, so that electricity can be sold across all 
European borders. Throughout the world, elec-
tric utilities are being deregulated and opened 
up to competition. As one observer has noted, 
"Other countries in parts of the world as diverse 
as Australia, Latin America, and Scandinavia 
have liberalised their own electricity system and 
are also achieving impressive results." ("UK 
Electricity") (Even here in Pennsylvania, a law 
was recently passed to allow consumers to 
choose among electricity suppliers, instead of 
having to buy only from the monopoly seller in 
their region.) The European Union energy min-
isters have met to discuss a variety of plans that 
would allow for European consumers to choose 
between competing electricity suppliers. 
However, EdF has done everything in its power 
to fight deregulation of the electric utility 
industry. Although EdF argues that a liberal-
ized market would cause utilities to overlook 
issues such as low pollution and energy securi-
ty, its real fear may be a loss of jobs. Unions in 
Paris have already protested deregulation 
because of this issue. ("How the French Get 
Power," p. 62) Once again, the loss of jobs could 
mean a loss of public support, which would 
have only negative effects on the nuclear pro-
gram that France has already sunk so much 
money into and which has been the symbol of 
France's energy independence for more than 
twenty years. 
Some EdF officials, however, do not feel 
that deregulation will have such a negative 
effect on their company. Pierre Lederer, direc-
tor and chief economist of EdF's Corporate 
Strategy Division, believes that EdF will con-
tinue to have an advantage over other compa-
nies in a liberalized market. Although he does 
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not agree that deregulation is the best thing for 
the utility industry due to matters of energy 
security, he does believe that EdF will still 
remain on top. In comparing the deregulation 
of the electricity industry to that of the U.S. air-
line industry, he has said: "Mter a period of tur-
moil, things settled down, and a handful of big 
companies assumed control of most of the busi-
ness. In this industry ... , the bulk of the busi-
ness will probably belong to no more than ten 
companies. And we're confident that EdF will 
be one of them." (Zakaras, p. 32) 
Under the Nationalization Law of 1946, 
EdF was granted monopoly rights over the 
import and export of electricity transmission 
within all of France and the concession to dis-
tribute electricity in all but 2, 789 municipali-
ties across France. (lEA, p. 200) The European 
Commission believes that EdF's monopoly vio-
lates the Treaty of Rome by inhibiting the free 
movement of goods. Following the threat of the 
European Union's competition commissioner 
to bring this issue before the European Court 
of Justice in 1993, the French government set 
up a group to review the necessity of reforming 
the electricity industry and regulation. The 
result of the group's efforts, the Mandil report, 
was submitted to the industry minister later 
that year. (lEA, p. 200) This report recom-
mended removal of EdF's generation monopoly 
and import/export rights. EdF would still be 
responsible, under the control of the govern-
ment, for dispatching from all French power 
plants and for the long-term planning of gen-
eration capacity. It would also have to purchase 
power generated by authorized IPPs based on 
solar, hydro, and wind power, as well as co-gen-
eration. Tariffs for these purchases would be set 
by the government. As for the matter of imports 
and exports, the government would reserve the 
right to authorize imports by large, energy-
intensive users. (lEA, p. 203) Other end-users 
and independent distributors would have to 
import through EdF in order to be in compli-
ance with the principle of geographic unifor-
mity of prices. Exports would be authorized by 
the government. It is apparent from this report 
that new proposals to comply with European 
deregulation do not equate with privatization 
of the electricity industry. In France, the gov-
ernment will still be in charge of this utility, 
regardless of the laws of imports/exports in the 
European market for electricity. 
On June 20, 1996, the European Council 
of Ministers for Energy came to an agreement 
on a directive to organize the European elec-
tricity market. The directive called for an initial 
limited market opening of 22 percent of the 
European Union market share. All sites that 
consume at least 100 GWh per year can begin 
choosing suppliers immediately. The Energy 
Commission will then calcuiate the average mar-
ket share across the Community of sites with an 
annual consumption of 40 GWh. These calcu-
lations will be used to determine a minimal level 
of market opening for all member states. The 
consumption threshold will be gradually 
decreased according to the following timetable: 
Probable entry into force 
of the Directive: January 1, 1997 
(access permitted on basis of 40 GWh 
threshold, though this is not legally enforceable) 
End of implementation 
period: January 1, 1999 
(40 GWh threshold becomes legally 
enforceable) 
20 GWh threshold 
takes effect: 
Commission to review 
"equilibrium" 
January 1, 2000 
clause: before July 1, 2001 
(to report on any imbalances in 
the opening of electricity markets 
in diff. member states) 
9 GWh threshold 
takes effect: January 1, 2003 
By 2003, the market opening should be 
just over 30 percent. ("UK Electricity") 
According to EdF, "The move represents a mea-
sured compromise, which does not call into 
question the security of long term electricity 
supply in Europe, but which does allow greater 
competition to offer customers the best possi-
ble conditions." (EdF, June 20, 1996) Upon 
adopting this directive into French legislation, 
EdF plans to adapt its commercial policies to 
the new market. In order to ensure its growth 
in this market, EdF will be focusing on its 
exports and new measures it must introduce to 
ensure success. Such measures include reduc-
ing its prices and offering new services in hopes 
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of ensuring customer loyalty. However, EdF 
will not be making any major overhauls of its 
international policies. It will pursue even more 
vigorously efforts of cooperation with its major 
international partners. 
In northern Europe, EdF has recently 
focused its attention on Graninge, the sixth 
largest Swedish electricity company, and 
Statkraft, the largest electricity producer in 
Norway. Other countries in which EdF cur-
rently holds major investments include Italy, 
Spain, Portugal, Hungary, Brazil, Argentina, the 
Ivory Coast, and South Mrica. 
Foreign Joint Ventures 
Although EdF remains reluctant to dereg-
ulate and allow foreign utilities to sell their 
exports in France, it has taken advantage of 
every opportunity to enter foreign markets and 
make money wherever possible. It has accom-
plished this not only through exports, but also 
through global joint ventures in South 
America, Asia, and Mrica. 
One example of such a venture is EdF's 
takeover of Edenor SA, the power distribution 
company for northern Buenos Aires, Argentina. 
When the company was doing poorly in 1992, 
the Argentinean government opened bidding to 
prospective buyers on it. EdF moved quickly to 
take over, using its financial means. EdF 
believes that its technical and managerial exper-
tise makes them the perfect company to turn 
around such ailing companies. It believes that 
the Edenor takeover has been beneficial for 
everyone involved. The quality of service to 
Edenor's customers has been improved, and the 
business itself has become very profitable. 
(Zakaras, p. 32) 
Even more worthy of attention is EdF's 
joint ventures in China with China Light & 
Power (CLP), the Hong Kong utility. In 1986, 
the French acted as consultants for the Chinese 
nuclear power plant at Day a Bay of which CLP 
owns 25 percent. Similarly, CLP and EdF 
formed a joint venture in 1994 with the 
Shandong Electric Power Bureau in the north-
ern Chinese province of Shandong to build 
three 1200-megawatt power plants at an esti-
mated cost of U.S. $2.5 billion. This would rep-
resent 40 percent of the province's current gen-
erating capacity. This is just the beginning of 
a larger plan to build transmission lines and 
additional power plants, as well as to plan net-
works over the next ten to twenty years. 
(Goldstein, p. 87) EdF's main role in these ven-
tures has been as a consultant overseeing con-
struction of the plants, as well as the training 
of Chinese engineers and managers to operate 
the facilities once the French engineers leave 
the site. 
These ventures are not solely motivated by 
profit, however. EdF's participation has mainly 
been due to its interest in keeping nuclear-power 
technologies alive. (Zakaras, p. 31) It has to if it 
wants to keep its own nuclear program viable. 
Government Subsidized Energy 
EdF has been focusing not only on its for-
eign investments, but also, in conjunction with 
the French government, on foreign investment 
in France. It has accomplished this by provid-
ing government subsidized low rates on elec-
tricity to industrial firms willing to develop 
their activities in France. As mentioned earlier, 
some of these companies include Exxon 
Chemical, Eka Nobel, and Allied Signal. This 
policy, of course, is beneficial to the French, not 
only because it helps to boost the economy, but 
more so because it creates jobs that can com-
pensate for the job losses that are a result of the 
decommissioning of power stations through-
out the country. This will become more impor-
tant as more of the first generation of reactors 
are decommissioned after the year 2000. 
Enraged over this issue of subsidized rates, 
one British electric utility, CBI, filed a complaint 
with the European Commission claiming that 
EdF was "using cheap power as an instrument 
of industrial and regional policy, thereby dis-
torting intra-community trade." (Cooke, p. 39) 
This complaint was initiated when a British 
company, ICI Runcorn, announced plans to 
move its chlorine plant from Britain to France 
in 1993 after its electricity costs rose 60 percent 
when the electricity industry in Britain was pri-
vatized. It also accused the French government 
of preventing the sale of UK generation in 
France. Perhaps this was an arguable point, 
particularly since France's EdF supplies 5 per-
cent of Britain's electricity. 
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EdF's response to this was that it has sur-
plus capacity, and that it is not unreasonable to 
sell power for what it can get rather than not 
sell it at all. The commission ruled in favor of 
EdF on the condition that it raises its prices by 
10 percent annually until 1997. It is believed 
that by then French consumption will have 
risen enough to absorb the surplus capacity. 
For France, which is extremely sensitive 
to unemployment, these deals are vital to the 
political equilibrium. Losing a major industri-
al investor would mean a loss of jobs; and, as in 
every other situation where EdF has been faced 
with the possibility of job losses, it is sure to do 
everything in its power to prevent such a crisis. 
After all, the future of the nuclear industry 
relies on the support of the French public. 
Conclusions 
The future of nuclear power generation in 
France is uncertain. After twenty years the 
French have become a "nuclear powerhouse" 
in terms of electricity generation. Starting in 
197 4, an intense program to build nuclear reac-
tors across the country led the French govern-
ment and EdF to spend billions of dollars on a 
quest for energy independence. They achieved 
this independence and are now being forced to 
return to interdependence with the passing of 
the EC Directive to liberalize the electricity 
industry in Europe. The question of whether 
nuclear power is the least expensive form of 
electricity generation will now be answered as 
EdF competes with other European producers. 
If it is true, it will be one of the leading elec-
tricity producers in the world in about ten 
years. The joint ventures that it has set up 
throughout the world will help EdF to gain this 
leadership role should the nuclear industry 
flourish. However, if nuclear power does not 
prove to be as efficient as other forms such as 
natural gas and coal, then EdF will stand to lose 
even more money than it already has, if not its 
market share. In order to compete in a liberal-
ized environment, EdF must truly evaluate the 
benefits and costs of maintaining its nuclear 
program and choose the method of electricity 
generation that yields the best benefits with the 
least costs, even if it means abandoning the sys-
tem that it has spent twenty years building. 
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